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Introduction
What is “mania”? What is its relationship to moods? Is 
it itself a kind of mood? Or is it perhaps a change in the 
way that we have moods? Should it be understood as the 
polar opposite of depression, or is the relation between 
these two phenomena more subtle and complex? These 
are some of the guiding questions that must be asked 
before engaging in a phenomenological investigation of 
mania. One of the basic tenets of phenomenology is that 
we cannot elucidate a phenomenon until we have asked 
after it in the right way.
In light of this introduction, I should make clear what the 
aims of this essay are, and what they are not. I do not offer 
a psychological phenomenology of mania, understood 
as a rich and systematic description of what it is like, or 
what it feels like, to be manic. Instead, I offer a philosoph-
ical phenomenology of mania or, to be more precise, a 
pre-phenomenological investigation of what we refer 
to as “mania”. While philosophical phenomenology is 
typically understood as an account of the essential char-
acteristics of human subjectivity, existence, or being in 
the world, there is an important preparatory stage to any 
phenomenological investigation. This preparatory stage 
can be conducted in various manners, but is generally 
concerned with the suspension of latent prejudices that 
threaten to lead a phenomenological investigation down 
the wrong path.
Summary
In this paper I examine the ways in which our language and ter-
minology predetermine how we approach, investigate and con-
ceptualise mental illness. I address this issue from the standpoint 
of hermeneutic phenomenology, and my primary object of in-
vestigation is the phenomenon referred to as “mania”. Drawing 
on resources from classical phenomenology, I show how phe-
nomenologists attempt to overcome their latent presuppositions 
and prejudices in order to approach “the matters themselves”. 
In other words, phenomenologists are committed to the idea 
that in our everyday, natural attitude, we take for granted a num-
ber of prejudices and presuppositions that predetermine how 
we conceive of and understand what we experience. In order 
to properly approach the phenomena themselves, we need to 
find ways of neutralising our presuppositions and prejudices in 
order to develop new (and hopefully more accurate) accounts 
of the phenomena under investigation. One of the most popular 
examples of such an attempt at neutralisation is what Edmund 
Husserl calls the epoché, which is the practice of bracketing out 
or suspending presuppositions. However, later phenomenolo-
gists developed alternative approaches. Martin Heidegger, for 
instance, engaged in etymological analyses to discover latent 
meanings in our language and terminology. Hans-Georg Gad-
amer also engaged in historical analyses of how our traditions 
sediment into latent prejudices. After discussing the various 
ways in which phenomenologists have attempted to neutralise 
presuppositions and prejudices prior to engaging in their inves-
tigations, I apply some of these principles and methods to the 
domain of psychopathology, and discuss some of the prejudices 
inherent in contemporary discussions of the phenomenon of 
mania. I examine recent attempts to link the phenomenon that 
we today refer to as “mania” with the ancient Greek concept of 
“μανία” (mania), and argue that the practice of linking contem-
porary and historical concepts can be detrimental to attempts 
at reclassifying disorders. In addition, I consider the implications 
of the shift in terminology from “manic depressive illness” to “bi-
polar disorder” – especially how conceiving of mania as one of 
two “poles” predetermines its description by both clinicians and 
patients. Finally, I address the implications of the headings under 
which mania and bipolar disorder are discussed within diagnos-
tic manuals. For example, I discuss the removal of the headings 
of affective and mood disorders in the DSM-5, and the explicit 
decision by the authors to place bipolar disorder between de-
pressive disorders and schizophrenia. What I aim to accomplish 
in this paper is not so much a phenomenological investigation 
of mania as it is a pre-phenomenological investigation. In other 
words, I offer a preparatory investigation of the phenomenon 
(or phenomena) referred to as “mania” in contemporary dis-
course, with the intention of laying the groundwork for further 
phenomenological and psychological research.
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views, or questionnaires. The aim of such studies is to 
give a rich descriptive account of “what it is like” to have 
a certain kind of experience; such as what it is like to be 
a single mother in the United States, or what it is like to 
be a cancer survivor. The psychological phenomenolo-
gist will take up her qualitative data and engage in a the-
matic interpretation, looking for primary themes that run 
through most, if not all, of the reports supplied by her 
study participants.
Philosophical phenomenology, by contrast, is comprised 
of a number of methodological tools – including the epo-
ché, the reduction, and imaginative variation. These tools 
are used to delineate essential features of human sub-
jectivity such as affectivity, understanding, temporality, 
selfhood, and intersubjectivity. Many contemporary phe-
nomenological studies of schizophrenia, for example, fo-
cus on the ways that selfhood, typically understood as an 
essential feature of human subjectivity, can become dis-
rupted or disordered 2-4. In order to properly account for 
such disruptions, phenomenologists differentiate among 
various levels of selfhood, pinpointing the level at which 
the disruption occurs. In addition, they might investigate 
the implications of this disruption of selfhood for other 
features and aspects of consciousness, including inter-
subjective relations, perception, and affectivity.
In spite of these differences between psychological and 
philosophical phenomenology, the two are not altogether 
unrelated. Their relationship can be clarified by attending 
to the distinction between evidence and subject matter in 
each discipline. In the case of psychological phenomenol-
ogy, the subject matter is what it is like to have a certain 
kind of experience. The evidence, on the other hand, is 
found in the data derived from first-person reports, inter-
views, and so on. By contrast, the subject matter of philo-
sophical phenomenology consists of the essential features 
of human existence, subjectivity, or consciousness. The 
evidence used in philosophical phenomenology some-
times consists of first-person reports of lived experience, 
but might also consist of thematic accounts of what it is 
like to have certain kinds of experiences, such as those 
produced by qualitative researchers. In other words, the 
subject matter of psychological phenomenology can play 
the role of evidence in philosophical phenomenology.
It is important to keep these distinctions in mind, espe-
cially in light of the interdisciplinary nature of phenom-
enological psychopathology, which often incorporates 
both psychological and philosophical phenomenology 
When applied to the domain of psychopathology – and 
specifically to the phenomenon referred to as “mania” – 
such an investigation is concerned with unearthing and 
making explicit the latent presuppositions and prejudices 
of researchers and clinicians, as well as mental health 
service users and the general public. By unearthing and 
making explicit such presuppositions, one is better able 
to uncover and engage with the phenomenon of mania 
itself, rather than engaging with the preconceived notions 
that cover over the phenomenon in question.
This article is structured in four parts. First, I briefly distin-
guish psychological from philosophical phenomenology 
in order to better situate my own project within the in-
terdisciplinary field of phenomenological psychopathol-
ogy. Second, I explain how phenomenologists prepare 
their investigations by attending to latent prejudices that 
might predetermine their accounts in problematic ways. 
Third, I offer an illustration of how phenomenologists at-
tend to such presuppositions by briefly describing some 
of the ways that Heidegger and Sartre attend to linguistic 
prejudices prior to engaging in their phenomenological 
investigations. Fourth, I apply some of these methods to 
the phenomenon (or phenomena) referred to as “mania” 
in contemporary psychiatric discourse. I discuss some 
of the prejudices that predetermine how we conceptu-
alize and approach mania, with the intention of laying 
the groundwork for phenomenological investigations of 
manic subjectivity.
Two senses of phenomenology
Before we can properly engage in a phenomenological 
or a pre-phenomenological investigation of mania, we 
need to clarify what phenomenology is. There are many 
ways that we might distinguish among different kinds of 
phenomenology. However, the distinction most central 
to this article is between philosophical phenomenology 
and psychological phenomenology a – by which I refer 
to phenomenology as practiced throughout the human 
and social sciences, including the medical sciences. Both 
kinds of phenomenology are used to approach human 
consciousness and subjectivity, and both approach it in a 
manner that is qualitative rather than quantitative. Where 
they differ is in their methods and aims.
Psychological phenomenology typically consists of 
qualitative studies of lived experience gathered through 
first-person reports, structured and semi-structured inter-
a There is also a form of phenomenology that is sometimes referred to as “phenomenological psychology.” This is typically characterized as a philo-
sophical phenomenology that is nonetheless consistent with naturalism and the sciences of the mind (rather than being consistent with transcen-
dental philosophy). Because this kind of phenomenology is not particularly relevant to the current investigation (and risks unnecessary confusion 
with psychological phenomenology) I will not discuss it further within the context of this essay. For further reading on this subject, see Husserl’s 
Phenomenological Psychology 1.
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ested in historical, cultural, and linguistic conditions for 
particular kinds of meaning b. While conditions for mean-
ing in general are typically referred to as transcendental, 
ontological, or existential structures, conditions for par-
ticular meanings are simply referred to as prejudices c.
In everyday discourse, we typically understand preju-
dices as negative biases, or preconceived notions about 
particular people or cultures. While this sense is in-
cluded in the hermeneutic notion of prejudice, the 
hermeneutic concept is both broader and deeper than 
the everyday sense of the term. Prejudices, according 
to hermeneutic phenomenologists, are not inherently 
negative. Gadamer, for example, defines prejudices as 
the “biases of our openness to the world” 11. The world is 
always opened up and made available to us through our 
prejudices, and it would be impossible to have any ex-
perience without them. While some prejudices certainly 
come with negative consequences – either for ourselves 
or for others – many prejudices are normatively neutral, 
or even positive.
A simple and straightforward example of prejudice is 
found in Merleau-Ponty’s discussion of a child who, en-
tranced by a candle flame, reaches out and touches it 12. 
After burning his finger, the flame (and fire in general) has 
a different sense and appearance for the child – and this 
change lingers, perhaps for a lifetime. The once entranc-
ing candle flame becomes repellant. In this case, there is 
good reason for the candle flame to be repellant, but this 
does not make the child’s newfound relation to the flame 
any less prejudicial.
A more complex account of the origin of prejudices is 
found in Young’s essay, “Throwing Like a Girl: A Phe-
nomenology of Feminine Body Comportment, Motility, 
and Spatiality” 13. In this essay, Young recounts Straus’s 
phenomenological and psychological study of feminine 
body comportment, including how girls and women 
comport themselves when playing sports. After consider-
ing a number of biological reasons for the differences in 
bodily comportment between girls and boys, Straus con-
cludes that anatomy cannot account for the differences in 
comportment. Instead, he argues that there must be some 
feminine essence 14.
Criticizing Straus, Young argues that his essentialist ex-
planation is inadequate, and offers an alternative ac-
count involving the passing down of certain norms and 
values that govern the constitution of feminine behavior 
(and sometimes a bit too fluidly). The particular aims of 
this essay fall into the latter camp, being more of a philo-
sophical than a psychological investigation into the phe-
nomenon of mania. In addition, it can be referred to as 
a pre-phenomenological investigation, insofar as its pri-
mary aim is to prepare for a proper investigation into the 
phenomenon of mania. However, these kinds of prepara-
tory investigations have always made up a core compo-
nent of philosophical phenomenological research.
Prejudice, history, and sedimentation
The phenomenological preoccupation with prejudices 
began with Edmund Husserl’s attempt to suspend or 
bracket his own metaphysical (and especially naturalistic 
and scientific) prejudices about the nature of the mind or 
human subjectivity. He achieved this by developing what 
he called the epoché 5. While his concept of the epoché 
developed and transformed throughout his philosophical 
career, it can be characterized as a shift from the natural 
attitude (in which we take our metaphysical prejudices 
for granted) to the phenomenological attitude (in which 
we critically reflect upon the constitutive features that 
must be in place in order for our world to appear to us 
in the ways that it does). This change in attitude is also 
characterized by a shift away from a concern with things 
(broadly construed), and toward a concern with essential 
features of the phenomena on question.
In spite of the centrality of the epoché in Husserl’s works, 
it was not directly adopted by his successors, including 
Martin Heidegger, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Jean-Paul Sar-
tre, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Nonetheless, each of 
these phenomenologists retained a general concern with 
and critical attitude toward prejudices – especially with 
how prejudices threaten to lead phenomenological and 
scientific investigations down the wrong track.
The post-Husserlian tradition that most clearly concerns 
itself with prejudices is hermeneutic phenomenology (or 
philosophical hermeneutics) as developed by Heidegger 
and Gadamer. While all phenomenologists study how the 
lived world is opened and made available up to us, her-
meneutic phenomenologists are particularly interested in 
how our openness to the world is predetermined in par-
ticular ways. To put it another way, all phenomenologists 
are interested in the conditions for meaning in general; 
hermeneutic phenomenologists, however, are also inter-
b This statement requires further clarification. It can be argued that the phenomenological study of prejudices already took full form in Husserl’s 
genetic and generative work 6 7 in which he studied how our life-world offered new possibilities for scientific investigations in light of our inherited 
conceptual backgrounds and understandings. While I do not disagree with this claim, the hermeneutic turn of Heidegger and Gadamer is still 
more closely related to the project I am engaging in, if only for its explicit concern with language.
c There is also another layer of phenomenological research that is typically referred to as modes. While I cannot offer a detailed account of modes 
in the space of this essay, I have offered accounts of modes in a number of other articles 8-10.
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prejudice the study of mania, it can be helpful to look at 
classical studies in phenomenology. 
Two studies of prejudice: “subjectivity”  
and “imagination”
In order to illustrate how and why phenomenologists at-
tend to linguistic prejudices, I here briefly address two 
examples. The first is Heidegger’s bracketing of the term 
“subjectivity.” The second is Sartre’s concern with the pre-
suppositions built into the term “imagination.” 
“Subjectivity” is often referenced as the subject matter 
of phenomenology. However, even this central term of 
phenomenology is not immune to the uncritical passing 
down of prejudice. In taking ourselves to be studying hu-
man subjectivity, we predetermine our approach to this 
phenomenon in at least three ways. First, the reference 
to “subjectivity” immediately brings up a subject-object 
dualism, which might be further qualified as a mind-body 
dualism. Second, it can bring with it the sense of being 
unscientific. Insofar as the aims of the natural sciences 
are to study objective phenomena, a study of the sub-
jective is immediately characterized as an investigation 
that does not meet the standards of rigor inherent in these 
sciences. Third, the term carries with it a sense of singu-
larity, or individuality. It presumes an isolated ego as the 
starting point of our investigations, which means that we 
will be required to give an argument for how this ego is 
capable of coming into contact with the world and with 
other egos.
While many psychological and even philosophical ac-
counts of human existence presuppose the legitimacy of 
starting from an isolated ego, phenomenologists are typi-
cally critical of such a starting point. Husserl, for instance, 
shifted over the course of his career from privileging sub-
jectivity to privileging intersubjectivity. Heidegger, for his 
part, was eminently critical of the prejudices that inhere 
in the terms “subjectivity” and “consciousness.” He large-
ly excluded these terms from his work, instead preferring 
the terms “being-in-the-world” or “Dasein” (which trans-
lates simply to “being-there”) 15. His reason for excluding 
the term “subjectivity” from his philosophical vocabulary 
was not that his subject matter was something other than 
subjectivity. Rather, he excluded the term because his 
ability to accurately characterize the phenomenon we at-
tempt to refer to by the term “subjectivity” is jeopardized 
by the use of this term (for the reasons listed above).
It is important to note that none of these latent prejudices 
that inhere in the term “subjectivity” necessarily result 
in inaccurate portrayals of human existence. Rather, the 
phenomenologist’s worry is that insofar as we remain 
unaware of such prejudices and allow them to uncriti-
cally seep into our phenomenological accounts of hu-
and comportment. In this way, Young’s account addresses 
prejudice in a double sense. First, she is critical of Straus’s 
own prejudices that predetermine the kinds of answers he 
is willing to consider. Second, her alternative answer is to 
take seriously the role that cultural prejudices themselves 
play in governing our behavior and comportment.
Another term phenomenologists typically use when dis-
cussing the historical passing down of prejudices is “sedi-
mentation.” While we are constantly affected by cultural 
milieus and life events, some of the meaning-laden fea-
tures of these milieus become fixed, constitutive features 
of our lived world, predetermining the kinds of meaning 
that will manifest for us. As Merleau-Ponty says,
Were it possible to unfold at each moment all of the pre-
suppositions in what I call my “reason” or my “ideas,” then 
I would always be discovering experiences that have not 
been made explicit, weighty contributions of the past and 
of the present, and an entire “sedimented history” that does 
not merely concern the genesis of my thought, but that de-
termines its sense 12.
In this regard, “sedimentation” in phenomenology and 
hermeneutics has an analogous meaning to “sedimenta-
tion” in the Earth sciences. In the same way that a body of 
water carries along particles, the temporal and historical 
flow of human life carries along an array of meanings and 
meaningful events. And just as some of these particles de-
posit and become sediment that reshapes the landscape, 
some of the meaning-laden events in our life sediment 
into prejudices that reshape the form of our lived world.
It is important to stress that while the term “sedimenta-
tion” brings to mind a sense of reification, this does not 
mean that what has sedimented is in any way inert. As 
Merleau-Ponty says, “this word ‘sedimentation’ must not 
trick us: this contracted knowledge is not an inert mass 
at the foundation of our consciousness” 12. Instead, the 
meanings and prejudices that have sedimented into our 
lived world orient us in particular ways, predetermining 
the kinds of sense and meaning that will be made avail-
able to us.
While the meaningfulness of life experiences in general 
can sediment into the prejudices of our lived world, one 
of the primary avenues for passing down such prejudices 
is through language. As Gadamer argues, language and 
discourse are always situated within an historical and cul-
tural milieu. Our terms do not retain their meanings after 
migrating from one cultural milieu to another. Because 
their meaning is always situated or contextual, changes 
in context necessitate changes in meaning.
This insight has important implications for the study of 
historical concepts, including the study of historical no-
tions of mental illness. However, before engaging in an 
investigation of the ways our language and terminology 
25
Language, prejudice, and the aims of hermeneutic phenomenology: terminological reflections on “mania”
will be approached as a pseudo-perception, essentially 
involving an intentional relation between a subject and 
an object. What Sartre is trying to make clear is that this 
account of imagination is an assumption built upon tacit 
prejudices, rather than the outcome of a philosophically 
sound reflection on the phenomenon itself. And, until we 
become aware of these prejudices, we have little hope of 
discovering in imagination anything but what our preju-
dices have already placed there.
With this illustration of hermeneutic investigations we 
can begin to apply these tools to the domain of psycho-
pathology, and specifically to the phenomenon or phe-
nomena that we refer to as “mania.”
Mania: a preparatory investigation
Why do we require a hermeneutics of mania? It seems, 
after all, that we already have a substantial literature on 
descriptive accounts of mania from the ancient Greek 
physicians, to Kraepelin 17, to the symptomatology pro-
vided in the DSM-5 18. As I argue, however, it is precisely 
these kinds of accounts that we need to regard with a 
healthy skepticism, analyzing not only the descriptions 
of symptoms, but also the prejudices behind these de-
scriptions. I here focus on three points of terminology and 
their prejudicial implications relevant to the production 
of a phenomenology of mania. First, I address the iden-
tification of today’s “mania” as described in the DSM-5 
with “μανία” [mania] as discussed in ancient Greek medi-
cal texts. Second, I consider the implications of the shift 
in terminology from “manic depressive illness” to “bipo-
lar disorder.” Third, I examine how the headings under 
which mania is discussed – such as “affective disorders” 
and “mood disorders” – predetermine the kinds of fea-
tures we attend to in our investigations.
It is now commonplace in psychological and psychiatric 
discourse to invoke the 2,500-year history of “μανία.” As 
David Healy points out, such invocations are often pre-
sented in the opening lines of journal articles and text-
books on bipolar disorder and mood disorders 19. These 
discussions add a sense of legitimacy to the disorder and 
its constitutive manic as well as depressive episodes (de-
pression being similarly linked with the ancient Greek 
accounts of melancholia). In a time when each iteration 
of the DSM seems to shower us with an array of new 
disorders, many remain skeptical of the reality of these 
psychiatric constructs. In light of this, it is of paramount 
importance that one be able to establish the reality of 
the psychiatric construct upon which one stakes a career 
(not to mention one’s financial success, as in the case 
of the psychopharmaceutical industry). While many of 
these disorders have histories dating back mere decades 
(if even that), bipolar disorder seems to establish itself as 
man existence, we always risk the repetition and further 
sedimentation of unjustified – and possibly inaccurate – 
portrayals of the phenomenon in question. Such a risk is 
something that phenomenologists are fundamentally op-
posed to, and they engage in a variety of methods devel-
oped for the purpose of unearthing, making explicit, and 
ultimately suspending or neutralizing such prejudices.
Another illustration of a phenomenologically preparatory 
investigation is found in Sartre’s book, The Imaginary 16. 
Here, Sartre offers a detailed phenomenological and psy-
chological study of imagination, images, and perception, 
with the aim of elucidating imagination in ways that ex-
tend far beyond standard philosophical and psychologi-
cal portrayals of this phenomenon. However, as he makes 
clear in the opening chapter, a phenomenologist cannot 
simply jump into his investigation of imagination unpre-
pared. To do so would be decidedly unphenomenologi-
cal, risking the reiteration of latent, sedimented preju-
dices about imagination, perception, and subjectivity in 
general. If the goal of phenomenology is to bring us clos-
er to “the matters themselves,” then such an unprepared 
investigation could hardly be called phenomenological, 
insofar as it promises to find in the phenomenon nothing 
more than what the investigator himself has already put 
into it.
Sartre opens his book by reflecting not on the phenom-
enon of imagination, but on what has been said of im-
agination and how the concept has been developed and 
repeated. As he says,
It is necessary to repeat here what has been known since 
Descartes: a reflective consciousness delivers us absolutely 
certain data; someone who, in an act of reflection, be-
comes conscious of ‘having an image’ cannot be mistaken. 
Undoubtedly there have been psychologists who affirm 
that we cannot, in the limiting case, distinguish an intense 
image from a weak perception 16.
In short, imagination has been characterized – in both 
philosophy and psychology – as a degraded or dimin-
ished perception. It is simply a perception that has lost its 
vibrancy and is less distinct.
These characterizations are easily arrived at, repeated, 
and accepted because they are built into the very termi-
nology employed in our investigations. By claiming that 
we are investigating “imagination” or a “mental image” 
we predetermine our account as one of a relation of con-
sciousness to its object. An image, after all, is always an 
image of something. Images refer to whatever it is they 
are images of. If we uncritically take up these prejudices, 
then we necessarily approach imagination as “a certain 
way in which the object appears to consciousness, or, if 
one prefers, a certain way in which consciousness pre-
sents to itself an object” 16. In other words, imagination 
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oaffective disorders, schizophrenia, and so on, then they 
are the conceptual forerunners of these contemporary 
disorders as well. However, one would be hard pressed to 
find an article arguing that the contemporary concept of 
schizophrenia has been with us for 2,500 years because 
it appears similar to some of the descriptions found in 
ancient Greek medical texts on “μανία.” In contrast, what 
makes the lineage from “μανία” to “mania” believable is, 
more than anything, the shared term. In the absence of 
this term, it is unlikely that one could get away with offer-
ing such pseudo-histories with the intent of establishing 
the legitimacy of the contemporary concept of “mania.”
The production of such histories threatens not only our 
understanding of the ancient Greek concepts of mental 
disorder, but also our ability to properly develop and ar-
ticulate our contemporary concepts. If we believe that we 
can draw a more or less clear line of descent from “μανία” 
to “mania,” we allow the contemporary concept to sedi-
ment even further; we forget that today’s mania is itself an 
artifact, a construct developed within a particular scien-
tific and cultural milieu. This is not to say that when we 
use the term “mania” we are not referring to a real form of 
suffering, and perhaps even to a phenomenon with neu-
robiological underpinnings. Rather, what we risk in the 
continual affirmation of these histories and the uncriti-
cal forgetting that follows from them is the reification of 
our contemporary constructs. When we become content 
with an unquestioned (and unquestionable) classification 
of disorders, we fail to engage in the critical reflection 
necessary for a successful reclassification.
In addition to the implications of this fabricated history 
of mania, we also have to attend to more recent termino-
logical shifts in how we refer to the disorder to which ma-
nia belongs. It is today all too easy to forget that the term 
“bipolar disorder” only rose to prominence in the past 
few decades, replacing earlier concepts such as “manic 
depressive insanity,” “manic-depressive reaction,” and 
“manic depression.” This shift seems innocuous enough, 
but we must be attentive to how a shift in terminology 
(especially when the history of this shift is forgotten) can 
tacitly reshape the conceptual landscape of the phenom-
enon in question.
In the particular case of the shift to “bipolar disorder,” it is 
worth considering how we today conceive of the relation-
ship between depressive and manic episodes, and how 
this conception has changed along with our terminology. 
When we today refer to “bipolar disorder,” we are imme-
diately presented with a picture of a disorder comprised of 
two opposing extremes; depression and mania are polar 
opposites. As portrayed in the latest editions of the DSM, 
depression is characterized by a mood of sadness, despair, 
or guilt, while mania is characterized by euphoria (or in 
some cases irritability). In other words, depression and ma-
a phenomenon that has been with us for millennia. By 
pointing back to “μανία” in the ancient Greek texts, one 
aims to establish an all-important legitimacy to this path-
ological way of being.
But this history of mania, taken at face value, threatens to 
predetermine our approach to this phenomenon in ways 
that are eminently problematic. As Healy points out, in 
order to effectively establish the purity of the 2,500-year 
lineage from “μανία” to “mania,” our historical accounts 
are often forced to walk the line between fact and fiction. 
As he explains, one of the primary anecdotes referred 
to in the course of establishing the lineage of “mania” 
is typically trimmed of most of the features that conflict 
with contemporary diagnostic criteria. In the standard 
rendering of the quotation, a woman is said to suffer from 
insomnia, loss of appetite, thirst, nausea, raving, dysthy-
mia, and incoherent speech. To the contemporary reader, 
the only symptoms that might be seen as out of place in a 
manic episode are thirst and nausea. However, there are 
a number of other symptoms that are left out of the stand-
ard quotation, including a high fever, profuse sweating, 
severe pain, dark urine, and increased menstrual flow 19. 
When all of these symptoms are discussed together, we 
see the apparently manic symptoms cast in a different 
light. The likelihood of Hippocrates’ patient undergoing 
what we would today call a manic episode is decidedly 
eroded.
Similar “histories” are found in contemporary work on 
the writings of Aretaeus of Cappadocia. For example, 
Angst and Marneros, in their brief discussion of the his-
tory of bipolar disorder, admit that “mania” in the ancient 
Greek context is a difficult concept to pin down. The term 
is found not only in the work of physicians such as Hip-
pocrates and Aretaeus, but also in religious and mytho-
logical writings, as well as works of philosophy. How-
ever, even while admitting the profound heterogeneity of 
what this term refers to, Angst and Marneros state,
Some authors have claimed that the concept of mania and 
melancholia as described by Hippocrates, Aretaeus, and 
other ancient Greek physicians is different from the modern 
concepts, but this is not correct. Rather, the classical con-
cepts of melancholia and mania were broader than mod-
ern concepts (they included melancholia or mania, mixed 
states, schizoaffective disorders, some types of schizophre-
nia and some types of acute organic psychoses and ‘atypi-
cal’ psychoses) 20.
While it may not be incorrect to claim that these early 
concepts are broader than the contemporary concepts 
discussed under the same label, the additional claim that 
the concepts are not thereby different is problematic. It 
seems that if the ancient concepts of mania and melan-
cholia do in fact include what we today refer to as schiz-
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of the presuppositions built into this term, we can more 
accurately attend to the phenomena of depression and 
mania, as well as the relation that holds between them.
In cases where a term has inbuilt prejudices that might 
cover over important features of a phenomenon, it is 
sometimes useful to put the term out of use (at least tem-
porarily) by employing a term that does not include such 
prejudices. As discussed above, Heidegger did this with 
his use of the term “Dasein” rather than “subjectivity,” in 
spite of the fact that the object of his investigation was 
what many philosophers would have uncritically referred 
to as the subject. Psychiatrists might do something simi-
lar (if less radical) by simply going back to terms such 
as “manic-depressive illness.” Such terms, while retain-
ing presuppositions regarding the intimate relationship 
between depression and mania, at least leave the nature 
of this relationship open to further inquiry in ways that 
“bipolar disorder” does not.
Finally, it is worth examining how we label mania in our 
diagnostic manuals, and how these labels predetermine 
how we conceive of their essential features. For example, 
in the DSM-III, the entry on mania is included under the 
heading of “affective disorders” 26. In the DSM-IV, this 
heading is changed to “mood disorders” 27. However, in 
the DSM-5 the headings of “affective” and “mood disor-
ders” have been removed; the headings of “bipolar and 
related disorders” and “depressive disorders” now stand 
independently of each other, without an overarching la-
bel to subsume them 18.
The general headings under which mania and other dis-
ordered phenomena are discussed may not be something 
that researchers and clinicians typically attend to. How-
ever, the authors of the DSM-5 explicitly acknowledge that 
the change in headings is meant to facilitate a reconceptu-
alization of bipolar disorder. The opening line of the sec-
tion on “bipolar and related disorders” reads as follows:
Bipolar and related disorders are separated from the de-
pressive disorders in DSM-5 and placed between the chap-
ters on schizophrenia spectrum and other psychotic disor-
ders and depressive disorders in recognition of their place 
as a bridge between the two diagnostic classes in terms of 
symptomatology, family history, and genetics 18.
Both the removal of the earlier labels of “affective” and 
“mood disorders” as well as the placement of “bipolar 
disorder” between “schizophrenia” and “depressive dis-
orders” were the result of explicit decisions made by 
the authors of the DSM-5 for the sake of facilitating the 
reconceptualization of these disordered phenomena. This 
new presentation is meant to tacitly emphasize the links 
not only between the symptoms of bipolar disorder and 
the symptoms of depressive disorders, but also the links 
between bipolar disorders and forms of schizophrenia.
nia are themselves conceived of as contrasting moods, or 
at least as contrasting sets of moods.
While this conception of the relationship between ma-
nia and depression as polar opposite mood states may be 
accurate, the use of the term “bipolar disorder” already 
predisposes researchers and clinicians toward this con-
ception. Earlier terms such as “manic-depressive illness” 
– while incorporating a sense of these two pathological 
ways of being as fundamentally related – are somewhat 
less restrictive as to the nature of this relationship.
By examining competing models of this disorder, we 
can gain a better sense of how our terminology allows 
us to take for granted the relationship between depres-
sion and mania. For example, in the 1960s, around the 
same time that a few researchers 21 22 began to devel-
op the bipolarity model that would replace the looser 
conception of manic-depressive illness, two alternative 
models were developed and put forward. These models 
are referred to as the “continuum model” and the “tri-
angular model.”
On the continuum model, depression and mania are 
not conceptualized as opposing phenomena with eu-
thymia or mental health in the middle. Rather, mania is 
understood as a more severe reaction than depression. 
The continuum, then, is between euthymia and mania, 
with depression standing in the middle. By construing 
the relationship between depression and mania in this 
manner, the continuum model is supposed to overcome 
paradoxical depictions of mixed states. Rather than hav-
ing to explain why features of two opposing phenomena 
can manifest at the same time, this model simply accom-
modates mixed states by positing that the movement from 
euthymia to mania (and vice versa) passes through de-
pression 23 24.
The triangular model, in contrast, posits each of these 
three states – depression, mania, and euthymia – as posi-
tioned on separate corners of a triangle. One can thereby 
move between euthymia and depression without moving 
through mania, between euthymia and mania without 
moving through depression, and between depression and 
mania without moving through euthymia. This again of-
fers a less paradoxical depiction of mixed states, while 
not necessarily characterizing depression and mania as 
polar opposites 25.
I am not here arguing that the conception of the relation-
ship between depression and mania that is built into the 
term “bipolar disorder” is necessarily inaccurate. In ad-
dition, I am not arguing that the continuum or triangular 
models more accurately portray the relationship between 
depression and mania. Rather, the point I wish to stress 
is that the use of the term “bipolar disorder” prejudices 
the development and clarification of our concepts of ma-
nia and depression. By maintaining an explicit awareness 
28
A.V. Fernandez
has been largely neglected in the contemporary literature. 
My hope is that this article makes some contribution to this 
area of research, not only by laying the groundwork for fur-
ther investigations into mania, but also by convincing oth-
ers to engage in similar hermeneutic projects that will set 
the stage for more careful and attentive phenomenological 
and psychiatric research in the future.
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